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1. Introduction 
 
Because of data scarcity, the linear expenditure system (LES) is often adopted in 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for the description of household 
preferences. The disadvantages of LES are that Engel curves are linear (preferences 
are quasi homothetic, see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980, section 5.4), that only inelastic 
demand (absolute value of the own price elasticity smaller than one) is permitted, that all 
commodities are gross complements (cross price elasticities positive), and that inferior 
commodities (expenditure elasticities smaller than zero) are ruled out (see, Chung, 
1994, chapter 2). A competing model for the description of consumer preferences is the 
indirect addilog system (IAS). It has been proved by Somermeyer and Langhout (1972) 
that IAS exhibits Engel curves that are non-linear, that elastic demand is permitted, that 
inferior goods are allowed for, and that cross price elasticities can be negative, 
permitting commodities to be gross substitutes as well.  
 De Boer and Missaglia (2005) prove that IAS needs exactly the same outside 
information (a social accounting matrix, all income elasticities and the Frisch parameter) 
as the LES in order to assign a numerical value to its parameters (i.e., the models have 
the same data requirement for calibration) and, in view of the richer description of 
consumer behavior, they propose to use IAS rather than LES in CGE modeling.   
 Houthakker (1960) has shown that IAS can be derived from an indirect utility function. 
An important question is under which parameter restrictions the indirect utility function 
satisfies the theoretical properties given in Varian (1992, p. 102): homogeneity of degree 
zero in prices and total expenditure, nonincreasing in prices and nondecreasing in total 
expenditure, quasi-convexity in prices, and continuity in all prices and total expenditure.     
 In the literature, there is no consensus, as rightly pointed out by Murty (1982), which is 
caused by the fact that there are (at least) two alternative ways of defining the indirect 
utility function. Murty gives, without proof, the correct parameter restrictions. We did not 
find the proof in the literature, either, so that the goal of this paper is to supply the full 
proof. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we review the parameter 
restrictions presented in literature, section 3 is devoted to the proof that the parameter 
restrictions by Murty are the correct ones, whereas section 4 gives some concluding 
remarks. 
 
2. Parameter restrictions in literature 
 
Let iY  denote the quantity that a consumer demands from commodity i (=1,…, N) and 
iP  the corresponding price. We assume that a consumer maximizes his utility subject to 
his budget constraint: 
 
 ∑
=
=
N
1i
ii YPC                                                                                                                     (1) 
 
where C denotes expenditure. Let the vector of prices be denoted by )P...P(P N1
' = . 
 
Houthakker (1960), who does not give general parameter restrictions, specifies the 
indirect utility function as: 
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Hanoch (1975) derives (2) as special case from a more general function, the so-called 
specialized CDE model, and imposes as restrictions: 0*i >α (page 411, his iB which is 
our *iα ) and 0i >β  (page 416, his ib which is equivalent to iβ−  in our notation). These 
parameter restrictions are also mentioned, a.o., in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, p. 84) 
and in Chung (1991, p.42).  
 Akin and Stewart (1979) give as parameter restrictions: 0*i >α ; 0i >β  or: 0*i <α ; 
0i <β ; no more than one iβ having a value less than -1. 
 On the other hand, Leser (1941), Somermeyer and Wit (1956), Somermeyer and 
Langhout (1972), Somermeyer (1974) and Gamaletsos (1974) start directly from the 
demand equations and impose as restriction on iβ that it should be larger than -1, 
allowing for negative values as well.  
 Murty (1982) correctly points out that the confusion about the signs of the parameters 
iβ has arisen due to the two ways of specifying the indirect utility function. He proposes 
the reparametrization i
*
ii βα=α  so that his specification reads: 
 
∑
=
β
β
α=
N
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)C,P(V                                                                                                 (3) 
 
He states, without proof, that the parameter restrictions are: 
 
0i ≥α  and 1i −≥β  for all i, the equality holding for at most N-1 items for iα  and for at 
most one commodity for iβ . 
 
In the next section, we slightly generalize Murty’s specification by subtracting the 
constant ∑ ∑
= =
=
N
1i
N
1i
*
iii )α(β/α to yield: 
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β
β
−α=
N
1i i
i
i
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)C,P(V
i
                                                                                          (4) 
 
The reason is that in the Box-Cox form (4) the special case that 0i =β  is defined to be 
equal to )P/Cln( i , whereas it is not defined in the formulation (3). Because utility is 
ordinal, (3) and (4) represent the same preference ordering.  
 We note that if 0i =α , commodity i does not appear in the indirect utility function (4) so 
that, for at least one item, it should hold true that 0i ≠α  (or, equivalently, that the 
equality sign holds for at most N-1 items for iα ). In the section 3, we only consider items 
for which 0i ≠α  and give the proof that Murty’s restrictions are the correct ones. 
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3. Proof 
 
An indirect utility function is well behaved (see Varian, 1992, p. 102) if it is:  
 
(i) homogeneous of degree zero in prices ( )Pi and total expenditure (C) 
 
(ii) nonincreasing in prices ( )Pi , and nondecreasing in total expenditure (C) 
 
(iii) quasi-convex in prices ( )Pi , but since we want to obtain a unique solution to the 
problem of maximization utility under the budget constraint, we impose that the 
indirect utility function should be strictly quasi-convex. 
 
(iv) continuous in all prices 0Pi >  and in 0C >   
 
It is straightforward to verify from (4) that (i) and (iv) are met.  
 To verify (ii), we take the derivative of the indirect utility function (4) with respect to C: 
 
1
i
ii
ii CP
C
)C,P(V −ββ−∑α=∂∂                                                                                                (5) 
 
which is a positive function of C for all 0Pi > , if: 
 
0i >α                                                                                                                              (6)     
 
(In case 0i =α , commodity i is not in the consumption bundle, as noted in the previous 
section). 
 We derive from (4) that under (6): 
 
0CP
P
)C,P(V
ii 1
ii
i
<α−=∂
∂ β−β−                                                                                           (7) 
 
i.e. the indirect utility function is decreasing in prices. 
 Consequently, under parameter restrictions (6), (ii) is met. 
 Finally, we turn to (iii). We have to prove that the indirect utility function is strictly quasi-
convex in prices if, besides (6), 1i −≥β  for all i, the equality holding for at most for one 
commodity. 
 To alleviate the notation, we put 1C = , so that the indirect utility function reads: 
 
∑
=
− −=
n
1i i
β
i
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α)P(V
i
                                                                                                       (8)                              
 
We will give the proof in three steps: 
 
(i) if 1βi −> for all i, then V (P) is strictly quasi-convex; 
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(ii) if one 1βi −= and 1j −>β for all ij≠ , then V (P) is strictly quasi-convex; 
 
(iii) if two (or more) 1βi −= , then V (p) is not strictly quasi-convex. 
 
Ad (i)  From (7) we derive: 
 
2β
iii
ji
2
iPα)1β(
PP
)P(V −−+=∂∂
∂
                                                                             for ji =   
             0=                                                                                                   for ji ≠  
 
Consequently, if 1βi −> for all i, V (P) is strictly convex, hence strictly quasi-convex. 
 
Ad (ii)  Without loss of generality, we consider the case that: 
 
1β1 −=  and  1βi −>  N,...,2i =  
 
We partition the price vector as: 
 
]P P[P ' 11
'
−=  where )P...P(P N2' 1 =−  
 
Then, we can rewrite the indirect utility function (8) as: 
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Since 1βi −> , N,...,2i = , the function )P(φ 1−  is strictly convex (see (i)). 
 Let two price vectors 1P and 2P  ( 21 PP ≠ ) be given and let λ  be a number between 0 
and 1, and substitute the convex combination 21
1
1 P)1(P −− λ−+λ  into (9):  
 
]P)1(P[]P)1(P[]P)1(P[V 21
1
1
2
1
1
11
21
−− λ−+λϕ+λ−+λα−=λ−+λ                                 (10) 
 
Since 21 PP ≠ , we have to consider two cases: 
 
(iia) 21
1
1 PP −− ≠  
 
(iib) 21
1
1 PP −− = , but 2111 PP ≠ , without loss of generality: 2111 PP >  
 
Ad (iia)  Because of the strict convexity of )P(φ 1− we have: 
 
)P(φ)λ1()P(λφ]P)λ1(Pλ[φ 21
1
1
2
1
1
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Then it follows from (10), using (9), that: 
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Consequently, V (P) is strictly quasi-convex. 
 
Ad (iib)    Because 21
1
1 PP −− = , we have:  
 
)P(φ)P(φ)λ1()P(λφ 21
2
1
1
1 −−− =−+                                                                                      (11) 
 
and because 0α1 >  and 2111 PP > , we have:  
 
2
11
2
11
1
11 PαPα)λ1(Pλα −<−−−                                                                                          (12) 
 
Substitution of (11) and (12) into (10) yields: 
 
)]P(V),P(Vmax[)P(V)P(φPα]P)λ1(Pλ[V 21221
2
11
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by virtue of 21
1
1 PP > (and 2111 PP −− = ). 
 
Consequently, V (P) is strictly quasi-convex. 
 
(iii)  Suppose, without loss of generality that 1ββ 21 −== . 
 
Let 1P  and 2P  be two price vectors which only differ in the first two elements and which 
yield the same value of indirect utility. Then any convex combination of these two 
vectors yields that value as well. Consequently, V (P) is not strictly quasi-convex. 
 This completes the proof that Murty’s (1982) parameter restrictions: 
 
0i ≥α  and 1i −≥β  for all i, the equality holding for at most N-1 items for iα  and for at 
most one commodity for iβ   
 
are the correct ones. 
 
It follows from this proof that Leser (1941), Somermeyer and Wit (1956), Somermeyer 
and Langhout (1972), Somermeyer (1974) and Gamaletsos (1974) only deal with strict 
convexity, rather than with strict quasi-convexity. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
(i) The demand equations are obtained from (3) or (4) using Roy’s identity: 
 
i
i
)P/C(
)P/C(
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∑α
α=∂∂
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It follows from (13) that the parameters iα  are not identified: multiplication with the same 
scalar leads to the same demand equations. That is the reason why we impose the 
identifying restriction: 
 
∑
=
=α
N
1i
i 1                                                                                                                       (14) 
 
(ii) Application of Roy’s identity to the Houthakker version of the indirect utility, (2), 
leads to the same functional form as (13), with iα  replaced by i*iβα . As correctly pointed 
out by Murty (1982), estimation of the parameters iα and iβ from (13) implies estimation 
of *iα  and iβ (and vice versa). 
 
(iii) From (13) we derive own price and cross price elasticities: 
 
1)e1()P,Y(E iiii −−β−=                                                                                               (15) 
 
jjji e)P,Y(E β=                                                                                                              (16) 
 
where C/YPe iii =  denotes the budget share of commodity i. 
 
It follows from (15) and (16) that the parameter restrictions 0i >β , given by Hanoch 
(1975), Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Chung (1991), imply that: 
 
1)P,Y(E ii −<  and  0)P,Y(E ji >  
 
Consequently, these restrictions rule out the existence of inelastic demand 
( 0)P,Y(E1 ii <<− ) and of gross complements ( 0)P,Y(E ji < ), which - in the context of 
CGE modeling - is empirically inadequate. 
 It follows from (15) and (16) that Murty’s restrictions ( 1i −≥β , with the equality sign for 
at most one item) do allow for inelastic demand, and for commodities to be gross 
complements as well. 
 Consequently, the indirect addilog model is more flexible than is commonly suggested 
in the literature. 
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